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Issues that are hot one Term are sometimes cold the next.  Incontrast with the 2008 Term—when the Court took on auto-mobile searches, the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, and the Confrontation Clause—the big cases of
2009-2010 addressed different issues.  This past year will be
remembered for decisions on the right to counsel for immigrant
defendants, the Eighth Amendment and juveniles, the applica-
tion to the states of the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms, and key decisions on jury-trial rights.  While the
2008 Term gave us Montejo v. Louisiana1— an important hold-
ing on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and police inter-
rogation—this year the Court returned to interrogation but
through the Fifth Amendment.  The justices decided three
Miranda2 cases, one of which may significantly alter police
practices. This article reviews some of the most significant
criminal-law-related opinions of the Supreme Court’s 2009
Term, emphasizing those decisions that have the greatest
impact upon the states.  The article concludes with a brief pre-
view of the current Term.
SECOND AMENDMENT
One of the blockbusters of the Term was McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill.,3 which applied the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms to the states.  Two years earlier, the Court
had decided District of Columbia v. Heller,4 finding that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and
bear arms.  Heller struck down a District of Columbia law that
essentially prohibited the possession of handguns in the home.
Almost immediately after Heller came the question whether this
right should be applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Five justices have now answered in the affirma-
tive, though no single theory commanded a majority.   Perhaps
the most interesting part of the decision is the discussion of the
incorporation and related doctrines.  (Non-enthusiasts may
wish to skip ahead.)
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, though parts
of the opinion represent the views of only a plurality (with
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts joining
Justice Alito).  The opinion contains a lengthy review of the his-
tory of the incorporation doctrine, as well as the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The plural-
ity turned aside an argument that the Court should reconsider
the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause pro-
vided in the Slaughter-House Cases.5 There the Court gave the
Clause a narrow reading, holding that it protects those rights
that owe their existence to the federal government, federal laws,
or the character of the nation, but that the Clause does not pro-
tect other fundamental rights.  The plurality in McDonald saw
“no need to reconsider that interpretation,” and turned to the
question of whether the Second Amendment right should be
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 After reviewing the history and framework of
the incorporation doctrine (perhaps necessary because no
incorporation cases had reached the Court for decades), the
majority found that the right to keep and bear arms is funda-
mental to our scheme of ordered liberty and is deeply rooted in
our nation’s history and tradition.  The plurality concluded that
the right to keep and bear arms is incorporated through the Due
Process Clause.  Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote for the
application of this right to the states, but under a different the-
ory.  While he joined the plurality’s opinion describing the
incorporation doctrine and characterizing the right to keep and
bear arms as fundamental and deeply rooted in history, he
would have revisited the Slaughter-House Cases and held that
the right is guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
as a privilege of American citizenship.
Justice Stevens, in his last dissenting opinion, agreed that the
Court should not reconsider the Slaughter-House Cases, but saw
the issue before the Court in terms of substantive due process.
He would have found that the right to keep and bear arms is not
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Justice Scalia, who
joined the plurality, also wrote separately to challenge Justice
Stevens’s views.  Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor), relying upon some of Justice Stevens’s analysis,
would have held that the right to keep and bear arms is not so
fundamental or rooted in history that it should be incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
applied to the states.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT
The previous Term gave us several Fourth Amendment
blockbusters, such as Arizona v. Gant7 (vehicle searches inci-
dent to arrest) and Herring v. United States8 (the exclusionary
rule and good-faith reliance on information in a computer data-
base).  This Term, by contrast, saw few Fourth Amendment
issues.  In the one case with far-reaching potential, the justices
avoided the most significant question.
City of Ontario v. Quon9—the case that wasn’t—raised the
question of whether a public employee has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in communications sent and received on his
government-provided pager.  Quon, a SWAT team officer, was
issued a text pager by his department, with a monthly limit of
how many characters could be sent or received without incur-
ring additional fees.  Quon went over his allotment several
times.  At one point, he was told that he could pay for the
excess usage rather than have to city audit his messages, and he
paid up.  However, the City eventually decided to audit usage
to see if the existing character limit was too low.  The wireless
company sent transcripts of the messages to the City, which dis-
covered that many of Quon’s messages were not work related,
and some were sexually explicit.  He was disciplined for violat-
ing rules by pursuing personal matters while on duty.  Quon
brought a civil-rights action; two other plaintiffs were people
who had communicated by text with Quon—his wife and a fel-
low officer with whom he was romantically involved.
The case attracted much attention because of the question
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
electronic messages sent and received on his employer’s equip-
ment.  On the facts of the case, that was not an easy question.
Quon’s department had a computer policy in place making clear
that the City had the right to monitor and log all network activ-
ity, including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice.
But text pagers are not computers.  The City initially told its
employees that it would treat text messages just like e-mails.
However, this notice was potentially undercut by the arrange-
ment that allowed employees, such as Quon, to pay for any
overages without audits.
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court declined to
reach the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy question.  Rather,
the justices assumed arguendo that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the text messages, that the City’s
review of the transcript constituted a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, and that the principles that
apply to a government employer’s search of an employee’s phys-
ical office also apply when the employer intrudes upon privacy
in the electronic sphere.  With these assumptions, the Court
simply found that the City conducted a reasonable search.  
There was some debate among members of the Court as to
whether to follow the approach by the plurality in O’Connor v.
Ortega.10 O’Connor addressed the framework for Fourth
Amendment claims against
employers.  The first step of
the analysis is determining
whether there is an expecta-
tion of privacy because some
government offices may be so
open that no such expectation
is reasonable, considering the
“operational realities of the
workplace.”11 Justice Scalia
joined in most of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Quon,
but wrote separately to argue
that the “operational realities” rubric in O’Connor is “standard-
less and unsupported.”12 In the end, however, the Court said
that under the approach of either the O’Connor plurality or
Justice Scalia (who said the inquiry should be whether the
Fourth Amendment applies in general to such messages on
employer-issued pagers), the outcome would be the same.
The most significant aspect of Quon is simply how reluctant
the justices were to decide about the reasonable expectation of
privacy.  The opinion expressly noted their reluctance:  “The
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear.”  Further, “[r]apid changes in the
dynamics of communication and information transmission are
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society
accepts as proper behavior.”13 Athough Justice Scalia chided
the Court for this discussion—saying “[t]he-times-they-are-a-
changin’ is a feeble excuse for a disregard of duty”14—even he
would not have reached the reasonable expectation of privacy
question.
There was one other Fourth Amendment decision in the
Term.  In Michigan v. Fisher,15 the Court summarily reversed the
Michigan Court of Appeals, and found that officers who entered
a home without a warrant were reasonable in doing so.  In a per
curiam opinion, the justices expanded on Brigham City v.
Stuart,16 where officers had entered a home to assist an injured
adult and stop a fight.  In Fisher, police responded to a report
of a disturbance.  They found a pickup truck in the driveway
with its front smashed, damaged fence posts, and three broken
windows in the house.  They saw some blood on the hood of
the pickup and Fisher inside the home screaming and throwing
things.  When an officer entered the home, Fisher pointed a
gun at him and was later charged for that act.  Under the cir-
cumstances, the majority found, the police had an objectively
reasonable basis for entering the home.  Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Sotomayor, dissented.  They pointed to the findings
of the trial judge, who was not persuaded that the officer had
an objectively reasonable basis for believing that entering the
home was necessary to avoid serious injury.
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FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Court decided a trio of
Miranda cases this term.  Two of
the three are modest holdings.
Florida v. Powell17 and Maryland
v. Shatzer18—decided a day
apart—addressed the adequacy
of warnings and when an invo-
cation of the right to counsel
may cease to be effective.  The third case, Berghuis v.
Thompkins,19 is a blockbuster that may transform interrogation
practices.
In Powell, officers advised the defendant that he had the right
to talk with a lawyer “before answering” any questions and that
he had “the right to use any of these rights at any time . . . dur-
ing this interview.”  He was not expressly told that he could have
an attorney present throughout the interrogation, and so Powell
claimed that the warning omitted a required admonition.  Not
so, said the Court, in a 7-2 decision authored by Justice
Ginsburg.  Citing California v. Prysock20 and Duckworth v.
Eagan,21 the majority reiterated that the inquiry is simply
whether the warnings reasonably convey the rights set out in
Miranda, but there is no required formulation of those rights.
The warnings given by Florida police were adequate.  “In com-
bination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right
to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interroga-
tion, but at all times.”22 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer,
dissented.   They concluded that when the warnings were given
their most natural reading, the catchall clause did not meaning-
fully convey Powell’s rights.  Justice Stevens also would have
found no jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision (finding the warning inadequate), since that court also
based its conclusion on state constitutional grounds.
Shatzer answered a longstanding question.  In Edwards v.
Arizona,23 the Court held that officers may not interrogate a sus-
pect who has invoked the right to counsel unless the suspect ini-
tiates contact with police.  But how long does an Edwards invo-
cation last?  As it turns out, not forever.
Shatzer was serving a sentence when he was questioned by a
detective about an allegation that he had sexually abused his
son.  Shatzer asked for a lawyer, and the questioning ceased.
Two and a half years later, a different detective learned more
information and wanted to question Shatzer.  He went to the
prison and initiated questioning.  This time Shatzer waived his
rights.  Shatzer made a statement that was introduced against
him at trial.  The Supreme Court unanimously upheld his con-
viction.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court described
Edwards and its progeny as “not a constitutional mandate, but
judicially prescribed prophylaxis.”  Such a rule applies where its
benefits outweigh the costs.  The benefits—preserving the
integrity of a suspect’s choice and preventing badgering—“are
measured by the number of coerced confessions it suppresses
that otherwise would have been admitted.”24 Where a suspect
has been released from pretrial custody and returned to his nor-
mal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation,
an extension of Edwards “would not significantly increase the
number of genuine coerced confessions excluded” but increases
the costs by excluding voluntary confessions.25 After conclud-
ing that a break in custody may terminate the Edwards protec-
tions, the majority determined that it was appropriate to fix a
specific period of time to give clear guidance to police.  The
Court set that period at 14 days.  “That provides plenty of time
for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive
effects of his prior custody.”26 In another part of the opinion, the
Court determined that Shatzer’s release back into the general
population was a break in Miranda custody.  Justice Thomas
concurred, but would not have extended the Edwards presump-
tion for 14 days following a break in custody.  Justice Stevens
also concurred, although he suggested that courts should look
to other concrete events or factors in addition to the passage of
time, such as whether a suspect could actually seek legal advice
or whether police honored a commitment to provide counsel.
Berghuis v. Thompkins27 completes the trio and overshadows
the other two.  Southfield, Michigan, police officers wanted to
question Thompkins about a shooting.  Thompkins was arrested
in Ohio, and the officers traveled there to interrogate him.  They
handed Thompkins a form advising him of his rights, which he
refused to sign.  Thompkins remained largely silent for almost 3
hours of the interrogation.  After about 2 hours and 45 minutes,
he gave incriminating responses to questions about whether he
believed in God and prayed to God to forgive him for shooting
the victim.  State courts rejected Thompkins’s Miranda claim,
ruling that Thompkins had neither invoked nor waived his
rights at the time before he implicitly waived them by respond-
ing.  He filed a federal habeas corpus petition.  The U.S. Court
of Appeals determined that the ruling was contrary to clearly
established federal law, and Thompkins should be granted relief.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.  
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy.
Although Michigan had primarily argued that the state court rul-
ings were entitled to deference on federal habeas corpus review,
the majority went further.  Following the lead of then-Solicitor
General Elena Kagan, who submitted an amicus brief, the Court
instead extended the holding in Davis v. United States.28 In
Davis, the defendant had initially waived his Miranda rights but
subsequently made ambiguous statements indicating he might
want counsel; these statements were insufficient to require
police to cease questioning.  Thompkins extended the unam-
biguous invocation rule of Davis to the right to remain silent as
well as to the initial invocation or waiver stage of an interroga-
17. 130 S.Ct. 1195 (2010).
18. 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010).
19. 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010).
20. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
21. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
22. Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205.
23. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
24. 130 S.Ct. at 1220.
25. Id. at 1221-22.
26. Id. at 1223.
27. 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010).
28. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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29. 130 S.Ct. at 2260.
30. For a discussion of the difference between a suspect merely
remaining silent and remaining silent but triggering an offi-
cer’s duty to cease questioning, see Laurent Sacharoff,
Miranda’s Hidden Right, available at:  http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1711410.
31. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
32. 130 S.Ct. at 2264.
33. Id. at 2262.
34. Id. at 2263.
tion.  The Court found “good reason to require an accused who
wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unam-
biguously,” noting that this avoids difficulties of proof and pro-
vides guidance to officers.29 Thus, after a suspect is advised of
his rights, he or she must unambiguously invoke either the right
to remain silent or the right to counsel in order for officers to
have a duty to cease questioning.30 A suspect may not invoke
the right to remain silent through silence, so Thompkins’ refusal
to talk for almost 3 hours was insufficient to require police to
curtail questioning.
The majority held that Thompkins’ silence was not an invo-
cation, and that his later statements affirmatively established
waiver.  Relying upon North Carolina v. Butler31 for the proposi-
tion that a waiver can be implied through conduct, the majority
held that “a suspect who has received and understood the
Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights,
waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced state-
ment to the police.”32 Although a valid implied waiver requires
that the suspect understand his rights, the Court essentially
placed the burden on the defendant to show a lack of under-
standing.33 The Court found that Thompkins understood his
rights, and thus knew what he was doing when he spoke.  “If
Thompkins wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing
in response to [the detective’s]
questions, or he could have
unambiguously invoked his
Miranda rights and ended the
interrogation.  The fact that
Thompkins made a statement
about three hours after receiv-
ing a Miranda warning does
not overcome the fact that he
engaged in a course of conduct
indicating waiver.”34
Justice Sotomayor wrote a
lengthy dissent, in which she was joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.  She observed that the interrogation was
very one-sided, nearly a monologue by the officers.  Thompkins
refused to sign a form and did not respond affirmatively to inter-
rogation tactics, such as an invitation to tell his side of the story.
On these facts, she would not have found a course of conduct
sufficient to carry the prosecution’s burden of establishing
waiver.  The dissenting justices also disagreed with the exten-
sion of Davis, noting a number of federal and state courts that
have declined to apply a clear-statement rule when a suspect has
not first given an express waiver of rights, and arguing that Davis
Thompkins leads
to an important
question:  will an
implied Miranda
waiver also waive
a suspect's Sixth
Amendment
rights?
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should not be applied to the
right to remain silent. The
warnings themselves do not
tell suspects that they need to
use particular language to
invoke the right to remain
silent, and the dissenting jus-
tices cited a number of cases in
which lower courts found no
invocations under Davis even
though suspects used fairly
plain language.  The dissenters
asserted that the decision
dilutes the prosecution’s burden of proof of waiver “to the bare
fact that a suspect made inculpatory statements after Miranda
warnings were given and understood.”35
In my view, Berghuis v. Thompkins is the Court’s most signifi-
cant Miranda ruling since Dickerson v. United States36 was
announced a decade ago.  Thompkins has enormous practical
implications for policing.  While many law-enforcement agen-
cies have already trained police about implied waivers and many
courts have upheld them, this case finds an implied waiver on
an extreme set of facts:  hours of nonstop questioning using a
full range of interrogation tactics on a virtually non-responsive
suspect.  In the wake of this case, we may expect to see more
agencies training officers on implied waivers and advising that
they may safely forgo seeking express waivers, even when a sus-
pect does not initially respond to the officers’ questions.
It is also worth noting what was not important to the Court
in Thompkins.  The majority did not discuss the effect of the offi-
cers’ interrogation tactics on Thompkins or his waiver—even
though the underlying premise of Miranda is that these tactics
create inherently compelling pressures—and Thompkins’s
waiver was in the midst of the interrogation.  The Court simply
assumed that Thompkins made a unconstrained choice to speak
after almost 3 hours of questioning.37 Perhaps this was because
the majority conceived that “Miranda’s main protection lies in
advising defendants of their rights.”38 Nor was the quality of the
record a concern to the justices.  The officers did not tape the
interrogation, though recording equipment was available to
them, and they did not take contemporaneous notes.  Thus, the
officers could remember very little about what was said during
the interrogation until Thompkins gave his incriminating
answers.
Finally, Thompkins leads to an important question:  will an
implied Miranda waiver also waive a suspect’s Sixth Amendment
rights?  One of the big cases of the 2008-2009 Term was Montejo
v. Louisiana,39 which overruled Michigan v. Jackson40 and held
that officers may approach and interrogate a suspect after his
Sixth Amendment rights have attached.  In Patterson v. Illinois,41
the Court found that Miranda warnings are sufficient to convey
the gist of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Patterson’s
express Miranda waiver also effectively waived his Sixth
Amendment rights.  But will an implied Miranda waiver also suf-
fice?  There may be reasons to find it does not—for example, if
Miranda’s main protection is the advice of rights, the Sixth
Amendment protects something altogether different and might
deserve more stringent waiver rules—but the question remains
open and courts may be beginning to address it.42
SIXTH AMENDMENT
There were a number of important Sixth Amendment deci-
sions this past Term, including rulings relating to various aspects
of the rights to a jury trial, to counsel, and to be free from dou-
ble jeopardy.  One of the most significant developments was
Padilla v. Kentucky,43 which established that defense counsel
must in many circumstances also advise a client of the immigra-
tion consequences of a conviction.
Effective Assistance of Counsel & Immigration
Consequences
Padilla was a lawful permanent resident of the United States
for more than 40 years, and a Vietnam War veteran.  After plead-
ing guilty to transportation of a large amount of marijuana, he
faced deportation to Honduras.  Padilla sought to set aside his
guilty plea, alleging that his lawyer not only failed to tell him of
the immigration consequences of his plea but affirmatively mis-
led him, saying that he “did not have to worry about immigra-
tion status” since he had been in the country for so long.44 The
state court denied his post-conviction petition, determining that
deportation (now called “removal”) is a collateral consequence
of a conviction and thus that counsel’s erroneous advice could
not provide a basis for relief.  The Supreme Court reversed 7-2.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected the state
court’s distinction between direct and collateral consequences,
saying that that distinction has never been applied to define the
scope of constitutionally adequate representation under
Strickland v.  Washington.45 Justice Stevens reviewed the history
of conviction-related deportations, and particularly the recent
trend toward eliminating any discretion to grant relief from
deportation.  In 1990, for example, Congress did away with judi-
cial recommendations against deportation, which formerly gave
sentencing judges an ability to make effectively binding recom-
mendations, and in 1996 Congress also eliminated the Attorney
General’s ability to grant discretionary relief from removal.
Currently, if a person has committed a removable offense, his or
her deportation is practically inevitable, though there are some
remnants of equitable discretion left with the Attorney General
for some types of offenses (though not for offenses relating to
drug trafficking).  With these changes in our immigration laws,
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said the majority, it is difficult to divorce the penalty of removal
from the conviction itself even though removal is a civil and not
a criminal sanction.
The Court ruled that where, as here, the deportation conse-
quences of a conviction are truly clear, there is a duty on the part
of defense counsel to advise of those consequences.  Justice
Stevens noted that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client
regarding the risk of deportation.”46 However, immigration law
can be complex and there will be many situations in which the
consequences of a particular plate are unclear or uncertain, and
there counsel’s duties are more limited.  “When the law is not
distinct and straightforward . . ., a criminal defense attorney
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration conse-
quences.”  The majority expressly rejected an argument urged by
the Solicitor General to limit the decision to circumstances
where counsel had affirmatively provided misadvice.  The Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether Padilla could demonstrate prejudice. 
Concurring, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts would
have accepted the limitation rejected by the majority and held
that an attorney may provide ineffective assistance by mislead-
ing a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequence of a
conviction.  However, they disagreed that an attorney has an
affirmative obligation to advise her client of the consequences of
a plea.  In their view, an attorney must simply refrain from
unreasonably providing incorrect advice, and counsel may tell
the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse
immigration consequences and that the client might consult
with an immigration attorney.  The concurrence also takes issue
with the majority’s position that counsel has different duties
depending upon whether the immigration consequences are
clear or whether the law is not “distinct and straightforward.”  It
will not always be easy to tell whether a particular provision is
consistent and clear.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented, arguing
that while in the best of all worlds defendants ought to be
advised of serious collateral consequences of conviction, “[t]he
Constitution . . . is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construc-
tion of a perfect world.”47 In their view, there is no textual sup-
port in the Sixth Amendment for a right to counsel to include
consequences that are collateral to prosecution.  Thus, the Sixth
Amendment provides no basis even for such a claim even when
counsel has affirmatively misadvised a defendant about the
immigration consequences of conviction.  Of course, such a
defendant may still assert, if he or she can, that a guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntary, which would be a claim under the
Due Process Clause.
This is an enormously important decision.  Whether or not it
opens the floodgates for future litigation (a claim discounted by
the majority), there is no doubt that the decision must lead pub-
lic defender offices and private defense practitioners to increase
their knowledge of immigration law and the immigration con-
sequences of criminal convic-
tions.  Courts may also play a
role here.  Justice Alito’s concur-
rence notes that there are rules,
plea forms, or statutes in 28
states and the District of
Columbia requiring courts to
advise criminal defendants of the
possible immigration conse-
quences of their guilty pleas.
Perhaps there is room to inquire
at change-of-plea hearings about
whether the defendant has con-
sulted with counsel about any
immigration consequences of a
conviction.  
Jury-Trial Rights
The Term saw important decisions on the Sixth Amendment
right to be tried by a jury drawn from sources that reflect a fair
cross-section of the community and on the effect of pretrial pub-
licity, as well as two summary reversals relating to jury selection
and the right to a public voir dire.
In Berghuis v. Smith,48 the fair-cross-section case, Diapolis
Smith was convicted of murder by an all-white jury in Kent
County, Michigan.  At the time of his trial, African-Americans
were 7.28% of the county’s jury-eligible population, and 6% of
the pool from which jurors could be drawn.  The Michigan
Supreme Court turned aside Smith’s Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals granted his federal habeas
corpus petition.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a unani-
mous decision by Justice Ginsburg, with Justice Thomas con-
curring.
Under Duren v. Missouri,49 a defendant must satisfy a three-
prong test to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement:  (1) the group alleged to have been
excluded must be distinctive in the community; (2) the repre-
sentation of this group in venires must not be fair and reason-
able in relation to the number of persons in the group in the
community; and (3) the underrepresentation must be due to the
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.50
The Court ruled that Smith could not prevail under the deferen-
tial standards applied in federal habeas corpus cases; the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
demands a showing that the state court’s decision involved an
unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.”51
Smith could not show that the Michigan Supreme Court
unreasonably applied the Duren test because the U.S. Supreme
Court had not previously specified the method courts must use
to measure distinct groups in jury pools.  One possible test
would measure absolute disparity, meaning the difference
between the percentage of African-Americans in the local, jury-
eligible population (7.28%) and the percentage in the jury pool
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(6%); here the absolute dispar-
ity would be 1.28%.  Smith
argued that courts should
instead measure the comparative
disparity, which is the absolute
disparity (1.28%) divided by the
group’s representation in the
jury-eligible population
(7.28%); here that gives a figure
of 18%.  The Supreme Court
noted that each measure is
imperfect, and even without the
deferential habeas standards,
the Court would not specify
which method should be
used.52 In addition, the Court
ruled that Smith had not shown that underrepresentation was
due to systematic exclusion.  Smith claimed that the county’s
method of assigning jurors, sending potential jurors to local
courts first and making only the remaining jurors available for
the more serious cases, siphoned off African-American jurors.
But Smith failed to provide sufficient evidence that this method
or other possible factors caused the underrepresentation.  Justice
Thomas concurred, indicating that in an appropriate case he
would be willing to reconsider the precedents articulating the
fair-cross-section requirement.
The pretrial publicity case was Skilling v. United States,53
which arose from the Enron Corporation debacle.  (The decision
also contains an important holding about “honest services”
fraud, which is discussed later in this article).  Skilling was a
high-level executive at Enron, serving as CEO up until several
months before the company went into bankruptcy.  He was
charged in federal court in Houston with conspiracy to commit
honest-services wire fraud, among other charges.  Skilling
argued that venue should have been changed due to massive
publicity about Enron, and he asserted that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury as well as his
due-process right to a fair trial.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed
Skilling’s conviction.  By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court agreed
and rejected these claims.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg first explained that
under the circumstances, the publicity did not give rise to a pre-
sumption of prejudice requiring a change in venue.  The prior
cases in which the Court had found a presumption of prejudice
from pretrial publicity were different.  In the foundational case,
Rideau v. Louisiana,54 tens of thousands of potential jurors in a
relatively small parish saw a televised confession by a defendant
in jail, flanked by the sheriff and state troopers.  In later cases,
extensive media coverage manifestly tainted the proceedings by
disrupting the trial or creating a carnival-like atmosphere.55
Here, by contrast, the trial took place in Houston, the fourth
largest city in the country, with a large and diverse pool of poten-
tial jurors.  The news coverage of Skilling and Enron did not
contain a dramatic event, such as a single confession, which
might be expected to leave an indelible imprint on jurors’ minds.
Additionally, over four years elapsed between Enron’s collapse
and the trial, and Skilling was acquitted of nine insider-trading
counts, which undermined a supposition of juror bias.
Next, the majority rejected Skilling’s claim of actual juror bias
and errors during voir dire.  Although the trial judge conducted
most of the voir dire, prospective jurors were required to com-
plete a comprehensive questionnaire, drafted in part by Skilling’s
attorneys, jurors were examined individually, and counsel were
permitted to ask supplemental questions.  Although Skilling
asserted that the trial judge should not have accepted jurors’
promises of fairness at face value, the judge did follow up indi-
vidually with jurors to uncover concealed bias.  The case was far
different than an earlier decision in which pretrial publicity con-
tained graphic details leading to a pattern of deep and bitter prej-
udice in the community that was also reflected in voir dire.56
Finally, the Court rejected arguments that several individual
jurors were biased, emphasizing that in reviewing such claims,
“the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle,” and that
a finding of juror impartiality may can be overturned only for
“manifest error.”57 The trial judge made specific findings about
the credibility of specific jurors’ assertions of impartiality.  There
was no manifest error in seating these jurors.
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but wrote separately
to argue that there can be no violation of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury unless a biased juror is actually
seated at trial.  He would reject the argument that the Sixth
Amendment can be abridged simply by the denial of a motion
for change of venue due to adverse pretrial media coverage and
community hostility.58
Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer) dis-
sented.  They disputed the Court’s characterization of the pre-
trial publicity, finding that it was more voluminous and perva-
sive than reflected in the majority opinion.  They conceded that
the motion for a change of venue was properly denied (calling
the question “close”), largely because of the size of Houston and
the lack of a confession or smoking gun piece of evidence in the
media coverage.59 However, they would have reversed for an
inadequate voir dire, noting that the jury was selected in a
process that took only five hours.  Even under a deferential stan-
dard, in their view the trial judge gave short shrift to the moun-
tainous evidence of public hostility, failed to pursue important
lines of inquiry during voir dire, only rarely asked prospective
jurors to describe personal interactions about the case or
whether they could avoid discussing the case with others, and
addressed topics in a cursory fashion.  According to the dis-
senters, the judge also accepted on their face statements of
impartiality that appeared equivocal.
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The defendant in Thaler v. Haynes60 objected to a prosecutor’s
exercise of a peremptory challenge.  The judge, who had not
overseen the voir dire, found a prima facie case under Batson v.
Kentucky.61 The prosecutor offered an explanation for the chal-
lenge based on his observations of the juror’s demeanor, and the
judge found that the explanation was race neutral.  The defen-
dant, who was convicted, eventually brought a federal habeas
corpus petition.  The court of appeals found that the state court’s
ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law under AEDPA, as a trial judge who had not overseen
the voir dire could not adjudicate a demeanor-based challenge as
Batson requires.  The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition
for writ of certiorari and summarily reversed in a per curiam
decision.
The justices ruled that the state court’s decision was not con-
trary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.  Batson
noted the need for a trial judge to take into account all of the
possible explanatory factors in assessing an offered reason for a
peremptory challenge.  Where the explanation is based on
demeanor, the judge “should take into account any observations
of the juror that the judge was able to make” during jury selec-
tion.62 But Batson “did not go further and hold that a demeanor-
based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not observe
or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor.”63 Nor did Snyder v.
Louisiana64 require that result.
Presley v. Georgia,65 another summary reversal, related to the
right to have members of the public attend voir dire.  The defen-
dant objected to the exclusion of a family member from the
courtroom during voir dire.  On appeal, the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction and found that no abuse of dis-
cretion in excluding the family member, especially since the
defendant did not present the trial judge with any alternatives to
consider.
In a 7-2 per curiam decision, the Supreme Court summarily
reversed.  There are two lines of authority that provide the right
to a public trial, the First and Sixth Amendments.  The Court
had previously ruled that in the First Amendment context, the
right to a public trial in criminal cases includes the jury-selec-
tion phase and the voir dire of prospective jurors.66 While the
justices had previously held only that the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial includes the actual proof at trial and pre-
trial suppression proceedings,67 the Presley Court found the
extension of the Sixth Amendment right to voir dire was so well-
settled that summary reversal was appropriate.  Further, “there
is no legitimate reason, at least in the context of juror selection
proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privi-
lege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the
accused has.”68 The trial court was required to consider alter-
natives to closure even when alternatives are not offered by the
parties.  “Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable mea-
sure to accommodate public
attendance at criminal tri-
als.”69 While there are cir-
cumstances where a judge
might conclude that safety
concerns or threats of
improper communications
with jurors justify closing
voir dire, those circum-
stances must be articulated
along with specific findings.
Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented, contending that the case should not have been
decided summarily.70
Double Jeopardy
The Court also issued a significant ruling on mistrials and the
Double Jeopardy Clause.  The defendant in Renico v. Lett71 was
tried for first-degree murder in a Michigan court.  The trial was
short—just nine hours—and the jury’s deliberations were even
shorter.  The jury sent out a note, asking what would happen if
jurors could not agree.  The judge asked the foreperson if the
jurors were going to reach a unanimous verdict, and he
responded “no.”  Without further inquiry or further findings,
the trial judge declared a mistrial.  Following a retrial, Lett was
convicted of second-degree murder.  He challenged his convic-
tion on the grounds that there was no manifest necessity for
declaring a mistrial and so his second trial should have been
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Michigan Supreme
Court determined that the trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in granting the mistrial and affirmed.  However, the U.S.
District Court and Court of Appeals disagreed, and would have
granted Lett’s federal habeas corpus petition.  In a 6-3 decision
authored by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court first described AEDPA’s deferential standard.  To
grant relief, a federal court must find an unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court.  The majority identified United States v. Perez72
as setting forth the “clearly established federal law.”  Perez pro-
vides that a trial judge may declare a mistrial whenever under all
of the circumstances there is a “manifest necessity” for doing so.
Prior authority also established that the decision to declare a
mistrial is afforded great deference by a reviewing court.  The
majority then pointed to other holdings in which the Court
declined to require a mechanical application of a formula to
decide whether a deadlock warranted a mistrial, and stating that
a trial judge is not required to make explicit findings of manifest
necessity nor articulate on the record the factors informing the
exercise of discretion.  Given these precedents, the Court held,
the state court’s decision was not unreasonable under AEDPA.
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The majority also faulted the
Court of Appeals for relying upon
its own precedents in determin-
ing that the state court’s ruling
was unreasonable.
Justice Stevens (joined by
Justices Sotomayor and Breyer)
dissented.  He took issue with the
majority’s characterization of the
facts.  The jury deliberated only
40 minutes the first day and only
a few hours on the second.  The
jury’s note only asked what
would happen if the jury could
not agree; it did not indicate that
the jury was already deadlocked.
The judge also cut off the
foreperson after asking whether the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked.  The entire exchange with the foreperson took only three
minutes and the jury only deliberated for four hours.  In addi-
tion to this haste, the judge did not poll jurors, give an instruc-
tion for further deliberations, ask defense counsel for input, or
indicate on the record why a mistrial was necessary.  Under these
circumstances, the state court’s conclusion was unreasonable.73
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Term saw a very important Eighth Amendment ruling,
Graham v. Florida,74 a challenge to juvenile life-without-parole
sentences.  The Court also handed down several decisions about
defense counsel’s duties in the penalty phase of a capital case,
including an unusual number of summary reversals.
Juveniles and Life Without Parole
Graham asked whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited
juveniles from receiving life-without-parole sentences in non-
homicide prosecutions.  Graham was 16 when pled guilty to
attempted burglary with assault or battery in a Florida court.
Adjudication was originally withheld, and he was placed upon
probation.  Graham was later charged with violating probation
by participating in a home-invasion robbery and other charges,
and he was resentenced on the original offense.  Though the
prosecutor argued for a determinate sentence and the presen-
tence report urged a sentence of no more than four years, the
trial court imposed a life-without-parole sentence, telling
Graham that “the only thing I can do now is to try and protect
the community from your actions.”75 The sentence was upheld
by the intermediate state appellate court, and the Florida
Supreme Court denied review.  The U.S. Supreme Court vacated
the sentence in a 6-3 ruling.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that the
Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality decisions have typi-
cally fallen into one of two classifications.  One is challenges to
the length of life or term-of-years sentences imposed in particu-
lar cases, such as in Harmelin v. Michigan76 (rejecting a propor-
tionality challenge to a life-without-parole sentence for cocaine
possession) and Ewing v. California77 (rejecting a challenge to a
25-years-to-life sentence for theft of golf clubs).  The other type
comprises categorical restrictions on the imposition of the death
penalty.  These may be restrictions related to the nature of the
offender, as in Roper v. Simmons78 (no death penalty for com-
mission of an offense by someone under the age of 18) and
Atkins v. Virginia79 (no death penalty for persons with low intel-
lectual functioning), or they may relate to the nature of the
offense, as in Kennedy v. Louisiana80 (no death penalty for non-
homicidal child rape) and Coker v. Georgia81 (no death penalty
for adult rape). In Graham, the Court decided for the first time
to take a categorical approach to a non-capital sentence.  As the
majority held, the case-by-case proportionality approach “is
suited for considering a gross proportionality challenge to a par-
ticular defendant’s sentence, but here a sentencing practice itself
is in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence
as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed
a range of crimes.”82
Taking this categorical approach, the Court then assessed
whether there was evidence of a national consensus against the
sentencing practice at issue in the case.  The majority noted that
37 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system per-
mit life-without-parole sentences for some non-homicide juve-
nile offenders and 6 states permit such sentences for juveniles in
homicide cases.  But “an examination of actual sentencing prac-
tices in jurisdictions where the sentence in question is permitted
by statute discloses a consensus against its use.  Although these
statutory schemes contain no explicit prohibition on sentences
of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, those
sentences are most infrequent.”83 Looking at evidence from a
study supplemented by the Court’s own research, the justices
located just 123 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving life
without parole, 77 of whom were in Florida and the remaining
46 spread among 10 states.
In addition to this consensus against juvenile life-without-
parole sentences in non-homicide cases, the majority found that
“none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized
as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and reha-
bilitation—provides an adequate justification”84 for a life-with-
out-parole sentence.  Among other reasons, juveniles are not as
culpable as adults, they are less susceptible to deterrence, and
they will serve longer in prison than similarly situated adults
(because the sentences are
imposed on them at earlier
ages).  In sum, while “[a]
State is not required to guar-
antee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of
a nonhomicide crime . . .,
[w]hat the State must do . . . is
give defendants like Graham
some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”85 Of course, it
is still possible that juveniles
who commit non-homicide
offenses will be incarcerated
for the rest of their lives.  But the Eighth Amendment “forbid[s]
States from making the judgment at the outset that those offend-
ers never will be fit to reenter society.”86
Chief Justice Roberts concurred.  He would have applied the
narrower proportionality framework that focuses on the specific
facts of a case, the offender, and the sentence.  Based on these
facts and circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts would infer that
Graham’s sentence was grossly disproportionate, an inference
confirmed by intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional compar-
isons of the sentence.87 But citing other cases with substantially
more gruesome facts, the Chief Justice calls the majority’s cate-
gorical decision “as unnecessary as it is unwise.”88
Justices Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia and, in part, by
Justice Alito) dissented.  Justice Thomas restated an argument
he has put forth before—that the Eighth Amendment applies to
the method of punishment, and contains no proportionality
principle—and also criticized the majority for eviscerating a dis-
tinction in  approaches in capital and non-capital cases.  He then
argued that the majority erred in looking beyond the language of
the states’ statutes to find a national consensus against life-with-
out-parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders.  If
one looks at the “overwhelming legislative evidence . . . [n]ot
only is there no consensus against this penalty, there is a clear
legislative consensus in favor of its availability.”89 Justice
Thomas also disagreed with the majority’s analysis of whether
juvenile life-without-parole sentences further the purposes of
punishment, and he would not have struck down Graham’s sen-
tence even under the Chief Justice’s narrower approach.  Justice
Alito additionally dissented and pointed out briefly that a sen-
tence of a term of years, such as 40 years, would likely not be
unconstitutional.90
Graham is significant in several respects.  It applied a cate-
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gorical approach to a non-capi-
tal case and it made a functional
assessment of whether there
was a national consensus
against these sentences.  It
remains to be seen whether
these two aspects of Graham
will be influential. 
Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel and Capital
Sentencing
An argued case, Wood v.
Allen,91 addressed whether a state court’s denial of a post-con-
viction petition should be upheld under the deferential standard
set forth under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)(2).  An inexperienced
lawyer represented the defendant in the penalty phase of his cap-
ital case.  While the lawyer read a mental-health expert’s report
prepared for the guilt phase, he was told by a senior cocounsel
that nothing in the report merited further investigation.  At a
post-conviction hearing in state court, the senior lawyer testified
that evidence of the defendant’s mental-health problems would
have been presented at the penalty phase if he had been aware of
it, and the junior lawyer in charge of the penalty phase testified
that he did not recall considering the defendant’s mental defi-
ciencies.  
In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court concluded that
“the state court’s finding that Wood’s counsel made a strategic
decision not to pursue or present evidence of Wood’s mental
deficiencies was not an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceed-
ings.”92 Much of the evidence, the justices found, speaks “not to
whether counsel made a strategic decision, but rather to
whether counsel’s judgment was reasonable—a question we do
not reach.”93 The Court also declined to reach a question on
which it granted review, whether 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e)(1)
also requires proof by clear and convincing evidence to over-
come a presumption that a state court’s finding of fact was cor-
rect.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented.  He
wrote that “the only reasonable factual conclusion” is that coun-
sel’s decision “to forgo investigating powerful mitigating evi-
dence of Wood’s mental deficits” was due to inattention and
neglect, “the antithesis of a ‘strategic’ choice.”94
Through a series of summary reversals, the Supreme Court
sought to provide greater guidance to courts, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys about effective assistance of counsel in capital-
sentencing proceedings.  
In Bobby v. Van Hook,95 the Court granted certiorari and sum-
marily reversed the Sixth Circuit, which had granted habeas cor-
pus relief.  In a per curiam decision, the justices held that the
federal court of appeals erred by measuring counsel’s perfor-
mance by American Bar Association standards issued years after
the trial, and emphasized that the standards are only guides as to
what reasonably diligent attorneys should do.96 Moreover,
counsel’s mitigation investigation was not unreasonably limited,
nor was the defendant prejudiced by any failure to dig deeper.  
In Wong v. Belmontes,97 another per curiam summary reversal,
the Court found that the trial lawyer’s alleged failure to present
additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase did not prej-
udice the defendant in light of the facts of the crime and the mit-
igating evidence that was adduced for the jury. The defense
lawyer had refrained from presenting certain mitigating evi-
dence in an effort to prevent the prosecution from introducing
powerful evidence of an additional homicide.  The Court did not
determine whether the lawyer’s work had been deficient
because—even assuming it was—the Court found no prejudice. 
We can contrast these cases (and particularly Wong) with the
summary reversals in Sears v. Upton98 and Porter v. McCollum.99
The petitioner in Sears was sentenced to death following a mit-
igation investigation that a state post-conviction court found to
be inadequate.  At the penalty phase, defense counsel relied
upon a theory, which backfired, that portrayed the defendant as
coming from a stable and loving household.  The truth, which
trial counsel never discovered, was quite to the contrary and it
also turned out that the defendant was low-functioning due to
brain damage and drug and alcohol abuse.  The Supreme Court
summarily reversed and remanded for the state court to make a
proper determination of prejudice.  Although the state court
found that the trial lawyer presented some mitigation evidence,
that does not foreclose an inquiry into whether counsel’s failure
to discover the additional evidence prejudiced the defendant.100
Likewise, in Porter, trial counsel had only one short meeting
with the defendant about the penalty phase, did not obtain
school medical or military records, and did not interview wit-
nesses.  This fell short of professional standards just as in an ear-
lier case, Wiggins v. Smith.101 Contrary to the view of the Florida
Supreme Court, counsel’s failures undermined confidence in the
outcome of the case, particularly in light of the moving evidence
(which was not presented) of the defendant’s combat experi-
ences, childhood history, and limitations.
FIRST AMENDMENT 
The Court struck down a federal criminal statute and over-
turned a conviction on First Amendment grounds.  The defen-
dant in United States v. Stevens102 was convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. section 48, which criminalizes the commercial creation,
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sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty in interstate or
foreign commerce.  The legislation was aimed at the market for
“crush videos,” though the videos involved in this case were of
dogfighting (which is still outlawed throughout the United
States).  
In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the justices first
declined to hold that depictions of animal cruelty are categori-
cally unprotected by the First Amendment.  Though it noted
some historic and traditional categories of unprotected speech—
such as defamation, fraud, and speech integral to criminal con-
duct—the Court rejected the government’s suggestion that
speech may be deemed categorically unprotected depending
upon a balance of the value of the speech and societal costs.  The
Court then determined that section 48 was facially invalid
because it was overbroad; the statute does not require that the
depicted conduct be cruel.  The justices also turned aside efforts
to narrow the construction, such as by implying exceptions that
would exempt from the prohibition depictions with certain reli-
gious, political, scientific, or other values.  Finally, the Court was
unconvinced by the government’s assurances that it would only
prosecute for acts of extreme cruelty.  Justice Alito was the sole
dissenter.  He would have remanded to decide whether the
videos were constitutionally protected but, in any event, would
not have found the statute to be overbroad.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
As usual, the Supreme Court decided a number of federal
criminal cases last Term.  While most may be of interest primar-
ily to federal judges and practitioners, the “honest-services”
fraud rulings may spark larger debates about what kinds of acts
should be considered fraudulent.
The main honest-services fraud decision is Skilling v. United
States.103 (The venue and jury selection issues in Skilling are dis-
cussed earlier in this article.)  Skilling was convicted for con-
spiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, among other
counts.  The federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes criminalize
using the mails or wires in furtherance of “any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud” as well as obtaining money by false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises.104 A number of
lower federal courts had interpreted these fraud statutes to per-
mit conviction for the deprivation of intangible rights, without
any financial loss to an individual or the public.  In McNally v.
United States,105 the Court limited the scope of these fraud
statutes in a case where a public official received kickbacks for
giving state business to an insurance agent but where there was
no allegation that the kickbacks led to higher premiums or
worse insurance for the state.  Congress responded by enacting
a new statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1346, that defined a “scheme or
artifice to defraud” to include “any scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.”  This was the
statute challenged in Skilling.  The justices unanimously
reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding Skilling’s con-
viction for conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud,
though they split on whether section 1346 could be given a lim-
iting construction.
Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg first
addressed the argument that section 1346 should be struck
down as unconstitutionally vague.  Although the statute was
meant to reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services law
and that law was in disarray, the vast majority of the pre-McNally
honest-services cases involved offenders who participated in
bribery or kickback schemes in violation of a fiduciary duty.
While a broad reading of the statue would raise vagueness and
due-process concerns, “there is no doubt that Congress intended
[the statute] to reach at least bribes and kickbacks.”106 Instead
of invalidating the statute in its entirety, the majority gave it a
limiting construction.  When limited to bribery and kickback
schemes, section 1346 is not unconstitutionally vague.  The
majority vacated the court of appeals’ affirmance, and remanded
to determine if the conspiracy conviction could be upheld on a
different theory (as honest-services fraud was only one of three
alleged objects of the conspiracy), and to assess whether a rever-
sal on the conspiracy count would affect any of the other counts
of conviction.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy) con-
curred in the judgment, but would have struck down section
1346 as vague without providing a limiting construction.  In
their view, the majority’s efforts to pare down the statute were
beyond judicial power.  They contended that no court before
McNally construed the deprivation of honest-services in such a
limited way and that the majority was essentially rewriting the
statute.  These justices would simply have reversed Skilling’s
conspiracy conviction on the grounds that section 1346 “pro-
vides no ‘ascertainable standard’ for the conduct it con-
demns.”107
Following the decision in Skilling, the Court vacated the
court of appeals’ rulings in two other honest-services fraud cases
(Black v. United States108 and Weyhrauch v. United States109) and
remanded for further proceedings.  In Black, the Court addi-
tionally determined that the defendant had not forfeited his
objection to honest-services fraud instructions when he objected
to the prosecution’s request for special verdicts; the special ver-
dicts might have revealed whether the jury convicted on a the-
ory of honest-services fraud.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Two decisions on aspects of federal habeas corpus may be of
broad interest.
A federal habeas corpus court will not review a claim rejected
by a state court if the decision of the state court rests on a state-
law ground that is independent of the federal question and ade-
quate to support the judgment.  The issue in Beard v. Kindler110
was whether a state procedural rule is automatically inadequate
under this doctrine if the rule is discretionary and not manda-
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104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. 
105. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921)).
108. 130 S.Ct. 2963 (2010).
109. 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010).
110. 130 S.Ct. 612 (2009).
111. Id. at 618 (citation omitted).
112. 130 S.Ct. 2788 (2010).
113. Id. at 2796.
114. Id. at 2797.
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tory.  Joseph Kindler was convicted of capital murder in
Pennsylvania.  He escaped from custody before his post-verdict
motions could be heard and before he could be sentenced.
Kindler was returned to Pennsylvania about seven years later.  In
the meanwhile, his motions were dismissed under a state rule
that permits (but does not require) a court to find a claim to be
forfeited when a defendant has become a fugitive.  When the
case got federal court, both the district court and the court of
appeals determined that the fugitive-forfeiture rule did not pro-
vide an adequate basis to bar federal review.  The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.  
In a decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
held that “a discretionary rule can be ‘firmly established’ and
‘regularly followed’—even if the appropriate exercise of discre-
tion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases
but not others.”111 The justices noted that a contrary holding
might have the perverse effect of encouraging states to adopt
mandatory rules rather than permit discretion to be exercised in
appropriate cases. 
The question in Magwood v. Patterson112 was whether a fed-
eral habeas corpus petition was “second or successive” under
AEDPA.  The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
In a prior federal habeas corpus petition, he succeeded in over-
turning his sentence, though he was re-sentenced to death fol-
lowing a new penalty hearing.  The state courts affirmed his new
sentence and he brought another federal habeas corpus petition.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that
some of Magwood’s claims could have been brought in the first
petition and, thus, those claims should be governed by 28 U.S.C.
section 2244(b), which restricts “second or successive” habeas
applications.  A closely divided Supreme Court reversed.  
In an opinion for the Court written by Justice Thomas, the
majority found that the AEDPA provision applies “only to a ‘sec-
ond or successive’ application challenging the same state-court
judgment.”113 In previous decisions, the Court had made clear
that the phrase does not apply to all petitions filed later in time;
for example, some issues such as competency to be executed
may not be ripe until some time after the first petition has been
filed.  The majority was persuaded that a habeas corpus applica-
tion challenges a judgment of confinement and “the phrase ‘sec-
ond or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judg-
ment challenged.”114 This interpretation would also be most
consistent with other parts of AEDPA, including the exceptions
to dismissal for successive petitions.115 Justice Kennedy (joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg and Alito) dis-
sented.  They would read the language of the statute differently
and would incorporate pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.
Under their reading of the statute, a second-in-time application
would be barred as successive if it sought to raise a claim that
the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise previously,
and a “mixed” petition would be treated as “second or succes-
sive.”  The dissenters were particularly concerned that the
majority’s construction of the statute would encourage abuse of
the writ when a petitioner has succeeded on even the most
minor and discrete issue relating to his sentencing.
A LOOK AHEAD
An early look at the October 2010 Term reveals some notable
cases though, as of this writing, perhaps none to rival the block-
busters of this past year.  
Two civil-rights cases present important questions.  One is a
challenge to a three-judge panel’s order to reduce prison over-
crowding in California.116 Another asks whether a prosecutor’s
office can be liable for failure to train prosecutors about their
Brady obligations.117
The Fourth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause are back on the menu.  The Court is slated
to decide if evidence is excluded under the Fourth Amendment
when officers act in good-faith reliance on a judicial decision
that is later overturned;118 the question has vexed courts since
the justices decided Arizona v. Gant and revised the principles of
automobile searches incident to arrest.119 Another Fourth
Amendment case asks whether officers can—through their own
conduct—create an exigency that may excuse them from obtain-
ing a warrant.120 Two Confrontation Clause cases posit whether
statements by a wounded crime victim are testimonial121 and
whether the report of one lab analyst may be introduced through
the testimony of a supervisor or other analyst.122 And the Court
will return once more to Miranda, addressing whether courts
should consider a juvenile’s age in deciding if he is in custody for
Miranda purposes.123
There are certain to be significant rulings and some surprises.
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